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A New Technology Policy for the United States
by Murray Weidenbaum
The Clinton Administration is right in proposing a new technology policy for the
United States. The existing array of federal activities ostensibly promoting research and development (R&D) remains unchanged from the early Cold War period and is clearly out of
date. The Administration is wrong, however, in proposing that federal encouragement to
commercial technology should take the traditional form- expenditure subsidy from the U.S.
Treasury -

that was favored when national security was the motivating force.

By its very nature, successful commercial technology is utilized by the private sector.
It is private companies that produce and market the goods and services embodying the fruits of
science and engineering advance. Hence, in order to be effective, any new technology policy
should focus on enhancing the basic incentives of a private enterprise system. This requires
reducing numerous governmental obstacles to the commercialization of new technology. In
contrast, dependence on federal departments and agencies for achieving or even directing
technological breakthroughs and their application will not work. As we will see from a
cursory historical review, that approach is reminiscent of the discredited hangover remedy
known as having some of the hair of the dog that bit you.
The Clinton Administration's Proposals
In its proposals to date, the Clinton Administration's technology program relies primarily on new and expanded federal spending. 1 One innovation it has introduced is to broaden
the standard definition of federal support for infrastructure beyond the traditional bridge
building and road construction to include a variety of projects justified as high-tech. These in-
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elude: investing in magnetic levitation transportation and high-speed rail; developing "smart
highways"; producing a "clean automobile" powered by batteries or fuels like hydrogen and
methane; building a national information "superhighway" to link up computers around the
nation; expanding the role of the Commerce Department to promote joint ventures between
business and government; and increasing partnerships between private industry and the national
laboratories.
Two major arguments have been offered to support direct federal involvement in applying technology. First of all, over the years the federal government has financed many business undertakings, especially in the area of technology. Secondly, other nations, notably
Japan, have gotten the jump on American industry supposedly because of the help from their
governments. Let us examine each of these two arguments.
U.S. Governmental Efforts to Promote Technology
Over the years, the federal government has financed many high-tech undertakings, but
past experience with government trying to force technological innovation is not comforting.
The three billion dollars the federal government wasted in the abortive attempt to develop a
commercial synthetic fuels industry was part of a vain effort to reduce our dependence on imported energy. (Deregulation of oil pricing was a far more effective approach.) A recent economic assessment of the synfuel program, by Linda Cohen and Roger Noll, is totally devastating:
The entire synfuels program had a quality of madness to it. Project after project failed . . . Goals were unattainable from the start. Official cost-benefit
studies estimated net benefits in the minus billions of dollars.2
But synfuels was not an isolated example. Similar failures occurred in the aborted supersonic transport project and in the Clinch River breeder reactor. 3 Similar shortcomings
continue to this day. Witness the space shuttle still seeking to define its mission or the financially hemorrhaging superconducting super collider. 4 The General Accounting Office (GAO)
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reports that the space shuttle's advanced solid rocket motor project has virtually doubled its
development cost in recent years -

to $3.25 billion. Meanwhile, the need for the advanced

motor has declined. s Sadly, the list of problems with federal "investments" in new technology
seems to be endless. In a December 1992 report on the National Aero-Space Plane, the GAO
states that the program "has been fraught with turmoil, changes in focus, and unmet
expectations. "6 These are only the latest examples of the basic failure of "industrial policy"
efforts that extend back to the days of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation scandals in the
1950s.7
How does the government decide which industries, technologies, and projects to support? Based on experience, government favors politically powerful firms, which usually means
older, labor-intensive companies. Over the years, these firms have invested substantial resources in improving their presence in Washington. Moreover, .these firms are the "squeaky
wheels," suffering the most from competitive forces.
New and growing firms may be economically strong, but they usually are politically
weak. They have neither a record of extended financial contributions to political candidates
nor sufficient knowledge of lobbying techniques and large groups of agitated employees/voters.
Former Senator William Proxmire was right when he said, "Money will go where the political
power is. Anyone who thinks government funds will be allocated to firms according to merit
has not lived or served in Washington very long. "8
The invention of the semiconductor shows the limits of government assistance. During
World War n, the government sponsored a huge research program in the fundamental properties of germanium and silicon, to respond to the limitations of silicon diodes used in radar.
Thirty to forty U.S. research laboratories were involved. Nevertheless, the important early
semiconductor device was invented at the civilian Bell labs, which did not receive a research
and development grant from the military for semiconductors -

until after its invention. 9

Every business going to Washington for financial help resents and tries to avoid the
term "subsidy." In contrast to federal subsidies to farmers, corporate executives always de-

4

scribe their extraction from the federal treasury as an investment in future economic growth or
some such worthy pursuit. The American-Japanese semiconductor agreement illustrates the
danger of this rhetorical approach. The agreement surely helped some firms, but at the expense of the American computer manufacturing industry. The results are typical of specialinterest legislation, benefitting some industry or companies or region, but at the expense of the
national interest.
As recently as the early 1980s, the American semiconductor industry outsold Japanese
firms. Japanese companies responded by investing more heavily than their American counter-

parts -

at a time when American firms could have afforded to stay ahead of the foreign com-

petition. Not surprisingly, by the middle 1980s, Japanese semiconductor producers began outselling American firms and American companies asked for a generous handout from the U.S.
taxpayer .10
The government's response was to subsidize Sematech, a consortium for semiconductor
manufacturing technology. It comes as no surprise to anyone familiar with the history of U.S.
industrial policy that Sematech favored the older, more established companies at the expense of
the newcomers who generate much of the innovation.ll
Reading between the lines of a carefully and cautiously written report on Sematech by
the General Accounting Office is revealing. Even if Sematech achieves all of its technological
objectives, Japanese competition will continue to have lower manufacturing costs per semiconductor chip because their quality is higher (a higher percentage of chips produced meet specifications). GAO notes laconically that Sematech might have worked better if it had more thoroughly assessed the market position of U.S. semiconductor producers and then adopted aninitial operating plan with realistic objectives and milestones. The agency notes that Congress
has set no deadline for terminating the large federal contribution (currently $100 million a
year12). Federal spending programs do have a life of their own. Another GAO report reveals
that five member companies charged off part of their payments to Sematech as overhead costs
on government contracts. Although legal, this procedure increases the federal government's
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total support to Sematech.13 It also helps to explain Sematech' s popularity with the recipients
of its largesse.
In any event, an important side benefit of the Sematech experience was the loosening
of regulatory restraints to allow the member companies to work together on pre-competitive
research. 14 That limited experiment in deregulation -

which does not require any government

subsidy -led to positive results and is worth repeating.
Independently, the U.S. chip industry has made an impressive comeback, concentrating
on innovative designs not especially connected to Sematech's efforts.
The current debate on whether government or private industry should take the lead in
building a new high-tech fiber-optic telecommunications network (the information
superhighway) provides yet another striking case in point of avoidable governmental subsidy to
high technology. The quickest way to achieve a data superhighway is to permit the existing
telephone and cable TV companies to compete using their current digital technology. For
example, Tele-Communications, Inc. of Denver is embarking on a $2 billion program to lay
fibre-optic cable throughout more than 400 communities across the country by 1996.15
Telephone companies are also showing a strong interest in this potential new market and could
use existing copper telephone cables.16 That will require the federal government to relax its
ancient regulatory restraints on interindustry competition in telecommunications.
Freeing new portions of the radio spectrum now blocked by administrative action also
could spur innovation. Rather than urging such long-overdue regulatory reform, proponents of
the data superhighway concept are proposing that the federal government build a more technologically advanced system on its own. But, as any cynic or seasoned observer of the
Washington scene would readily expect, the notion of government subsidy to
telecommunications has attracted support from many quarters. The proponents of a new hightechnology handout range from prospective suppliers of equipment (many companies are
attracted by the prospect of lucrative contracts) to prospective users (who expect the
government to subsidize their access to the network) .17 Moreover, some communications
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experts warn that moving too rapidly would result in the United States having the first, but the
world's most primitive, fiber-optic communications system.18

Foreign Experience
Proponents of more federal subsidies to private business, including the utilization of
science and technology, cite the example of Japan. Japan's Ministry of International Trade and
Industry (MITI) is often heralded as a fine example of successful business-government cooperation, but the details are not as convincing. MITI is a powerful agency of the Japanese government, with substantial influence over business decisionmaking. However, its own decisions
have not been altogether wise. MITI attempted to keep Sony from entering the consumer
electronic market. MITI also tried to keep Mazda and Honda out of the auto business because
it badly underestimated the growth of Japan's export market. Then there was MITI's textile fiasco. MITI bought and scrapped 180,000 looms to finance the textile cartel it was setting up.
At the same time, however, 160,000 illegal looms came into production.19
MITI also purchased a 30 percent stake in an international consortium building a new
jet engine. In part because of numerous delays in the project, the major Japanese airlines continue to buy jet airliners powered by U.S.-built engines.
Shipbuilding is also portrayed as another classic MITI success story. Following World
War II, MITI used subsidies to nurture this industry, and by 1957 Japan was the world's
largest shipbuilder. In the early 1970s, when Korea's comparative advantage became clear,
MITI began to shift resources out of shipbuilding in favor of new growth sectors -

or so the

admirers of MITI claim. While the results are essentially as portrayed, Japanese industrial
policy was by no means so farsighted.

In practice, MITI's subsidies were provided only to ships that were to be operated under the Japanese flag and that employed Japanese seamen. As the rising wages of these seamen
undermined their competitive position, Japanese shipping firms gradually switched to ships operating under foreign "flags of convenience" during the 1970s. (Sounds familiar?) The result
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was a large decline in subsidized shipbuilding and, thus, in total Japanese shipbuilding. This
negative trend occurred even while MITI was forecasting increases in the demand for Japanesebuilt ships. Japanese industrial policy plans did not foresee either a decline in domestic shipbuilding or an increase in the use of foreign ships. Once again, market forces thwarted government efforts to sustain a domestic industry. 20
HDTV provides a current example of Japanese government failure. That government
chose the technology that would be used for HDTV in its country and financed the development. However, it now seems that the analog technology selected by the Japanese government
turns out to be inferior to other alternatives. Without the "benefit" of similar government as-

sistance, the U.S. industry has developed promising alternatives to Japanese HDTV using digital technology which is of a higher quality.21 This year, the European Community abandoned
development of its analog approach to a new generation of television -

acknowledging the

superiority of U.S. digital technology.22
On a more positive note, the Japanese response since 1987 to the rise of the yen in
world currency markets is very revealing. On their own, Japanese companies took quick and
tough actions to restore their global competitiveness. Within weeks, or at most months, of the
change in the external financial environment, many of them undertook vigorous campaigns to
improve productivity. Efforts to upgrade quality were made. Some manufacturing operations
were quickly moved to lower-cost locations and, in some cases, senior executives reduced their
own salaries. MITI was not particularly involved at all.

A Free Lunch From the Peace Dividend?
Many people who are concerned with a lag of American industry in international competitiveness see a new source of financing for all sorts of panaceas -

the peace dividend sup-

posedly arising from the end of the Cold War. For example, some would have the Department
of Defense finance civilian technology directly, conveniently overlooking the fact that the mil-
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itary buildup was financed out of borrowed money. There is no surplus cash sloshing around
in the U.S. Treasury.
Others justify their desire to have the Department of Defense subsidize civilian science
and technology by pointing to the armed services as important users of society's pool of scientific and technical knowledge. 23 But there is no limit to that line of reasoning, given the large
military purchases of items ranging from missiles to mittens, from ground support equipment
to golf balls.
Proposals to expand the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) are a
convenient way of bypassing traditional military procurement procedures. Little known and
small in size by Washington standards, DARPA provides funds to over 300 corporations and
universities to conduct high-risk research. Over the past thirty years, DARPA-funded products
have led to the development and commercialization of computer time-sharing, advanced aeronautics, new types of software, and new telecommunications procedures.
DARPA already finances private-sector R&D in a variety of areas -

superconductiv-

ity, advanced semiconductors, high-definition television, and very sophisticated types of integrated circuits. While DARPA justifies its sponsorship of these projects because of their expected relevance to military missions, many of the technologies being developed are expected
to help American industries compete in commercial markets. About one-half of DARPA's
budget is currently allocated to such dual-use technologies that have both civilian and military
applications. However, DARPA is no magician. It operates in the special world of military
procurement, where one monopsonistic buyer dominates the market. Surely, DARPA has experienced its share of flops. After spending 200 million dollars, it closed the books on an experimental helicopter-airplane.

Anothe~

project that fell short was a scheme to use artificial

intelligence to guide a combat vehicle over rough terrain. 24
Some compare DARPA with Japan's MITI. But, unlike DARPA, MITI is a cabinetlevel agency that is charged with enhancing the nation's international competitiveness.
Expanding the role of DARPA to include all of the civilian technology that other federal de-
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partments and agencies are willing to sponsor, as is now being urged, would dilute DARPA's
mission and weaken its focus. To a significant degree, DARPA has succeeded by virtue of its
ability to bypass the Pentagon bureaucracy. If it gets much larger, it will likely lose this special characteristic.
A more fundamental objection to using the military budget to support private-sector
technology is that it will politicize the process. Giving the Department of Defense, rather than
the marketplace, the authority to choose the technologies and firms to be funded is an incentive
for political pressures. History tells us that such opportunities will not go unused for long.
We need go no further than the Army Corps of Engineers for an illustration. The Corps' military functions are first rate. Its civilian dam-building activities, however, are embroiled in
politics and have generated numerous projects with little economic justification. The Corps'
record of generating "pork" for powerful legislators is hardly a precedent that justifies expanding the role of the Department of Defense in the civilian economy. To sum up the point
in this age of quantification, the direct role of the military establishment in promoting civilian
technology should be, to four or more decimal places, zero!
Some analysts urge that a strengthened Department of Commerce should provide
greater investment in the development of the nation's technology base. In 1988, Congress
converted the staid old National Bureau of Standards into the National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST). The expanded agency is handing out millions of dollars in seed
money to the private sector to develop high-tech proposals and, as noted earlier, the Clinton
Administration wants to expand these efforts rapidly. Having a federal civilian agency determine which new areas of commercial technology will be subsidized by government is only
marginally better than giving the role to the Pentagon.
As we have seen, there is little in the history of federal support of technology to justify
the optimism that underlies this approach. Government- at least in the United States- is
not good at choosing which areas of technology to support and which organizations to do the
work. We are much better off when private enterprises risk their own capital in selecting
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technological activities and then carry through on the successful ventures. A recent report
from the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) makes that point clearly. NBER
Research Associate Frank Lichtenberg, professor of economics at Columbia University, found
that the net impact on productivity of government R&D spending is lower than the return on
privately funded R&D and may even be negative. In striking contrast, his research shows that
the social return to private R&D investment is about seven times as large as on plant and
equipment. 25
This macroeconomic approach is reinforced by a more microeconomic study by the
General Accounting Office. GAO reports that most small manufacturers cannot effectively use
the advanced state-of-the-art automated technologies developed at the Department of
Commerce's National Institute of Standards and Technology.26
On reflection, these results are not surprising. When a company's own laboratory
comes up with a product or process advance, there are far fewer barriers to using it than when
government takes on that role. The many pathetic efforts of the Department of Commerce to
interest private business in using the research it has financed reminds me of a forlorn street
comer vendor trying to peddle his wares to preoccupied passersby.

A Positive Approach to Encouraging Technology
Government can play an important role in promoting technology, and with a minimum
of expenditure or intervention in private decisionmaking. So far, the Clinton Administration
has ignored this positive approach. It is to create a business environment which is more conducive to using new technology by eliminating or at least reducing the numerous obstacles to
innovation that government itself has erected over the years. Most proponents of increased
federal spending for technology ignore the wide variety of regulatory restrictions that inhibit
the growth and application of corporate R&D. It is futile for the federal government to pour
vast sums into high-tech enterprises if, at the same time, it continues to erect statutory and ad-
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ministrative roadblocks to the application of those new technologies. That's like a driver who
has one foot on the gas pedal and the other on the brake.
The supporters of large-scale federal outlays for new technology seem to operate in a
policy vacuum. They are oblivious to the fact that the deregulating trend of the late 1970s and
early 1980s has been replaced by expanded government regulation of business.27 Because
many federal agencies exempt existing facilities, products, and processes from such directives,
the main burden of expanding regulation falls on new enterprises, new undertakings, and new
technology.
Consider America's world-class pharmaceutical industry, which generates substantially
more exports than imports. President Clinton ran on an economic program that specified that
he would be "cracking down" on the industry for its high prices and profits.28 (Parenthetically, in recent years, prescription medicine prices have risen at about the same rate as
health-care costs generally.) But if he carries out his threat, it is a sure-fire guarantee of
slowing down the rapid rate of new-product innovation that characterizes the pharmaceutical
industry.

In a large number of cases -

chemicals, pharmaceuticals, and biotechnology -

the

supply of venture capital is substantial; the key limitation is not financial. The major constraint on commercializing technology arises from government itself. 29 Consider the hysterical
reaction to the use of the protein BST in increasing the production of milk. Aside from health
concerns, which have been fully addressed by the FDA, "consumer advocates" vehemently
oppose the move because it reduces the price of milk. State legislatures follow their lead by
preventing the use of this advance in biotechnology. Governmental actions like that have a
powerfully negative effect on the incentive to commercialize new technology, notwithstanding
large amounts of federal financial support for "precompetitive R&D."
The uncertainty engendered by government and special interest groups has hindered the
development of biotechnology generally. While scientists are able to engineer more prolific
crop strains, the regulatory framework governing the commercialization of their work remains
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ill-defined. One analyst warns that, under such circumstances, some companies may avoid the
problem by going overseas via joint ventures or establishing new subsidiaries. 30
There is a modest direct role for government in supporting commercially oriented
technology and here some reforms would be desirable. 31 For example, a simpler and more effective patent system would encourage the creation and diffusion of technology. Such a change
would ensure that smaller inventors are not overwhelmed by the cost of obtaining patents and
defending them against legal challenges. Also, larger firms would be encouraged to seek
patents rather than protecting their new products and processes by maintaining secrecy.

In addition, revisions in the antitrust laws are needed to avoid impeding the formation
of joint ventures to develop new technology. According to the private Council on Competitiveness, current antitrust laws -

or even the perception of them -

discourage technological

cooperation among companies, trade associations, and professional societies. 32 The capital
requirements to develop what is termed "generic" or "pre-competitive" technology are often
beyond the financial capability of a single firm. Waiving or amending the antitrust statutes is a
far more sensible approach than urging the federal government to provide the necessary
financial support. But, most fundamentally, a substantial dose of deregulation regulatory reform -

or at least

would be quite helpful.

Another desirable contribution that the federal government could make to foster private
technology is to privatize the hundreds of national laboratories, converting them into private
institutions for profit as well as non-profit. Given the substantial federal investment made in
these laboratories during the Cold War, many of them constitute excellent research facilities.
Private-sector use is now generally limited to specialized equipment, such as particle
accelerators. The Clinton Administration's proposal to find a civilian mission for the labs
through partnerships with private business is misguided. If, instead, these labs were privatized, firms in the private sector would be more likely to use their expertise designing new
products. 33
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Tax Incentives
It is also necessary to respond to the concern that society as a whole underinvests in
applied research and development because of various imperfections in the market economy.
Potential entrepreneurs and financiers of new high-tech ventures may lack adequate information
about the opportunities in and returns from such investments. As noted earlier, the overall re-

turns on applied research and development are quite high in relation to traditional economic
activity. Under the circumstances, government action to lower the private-sector's decisionmaking threshold on R&D would be useful, provided it is done in a manner that preserves the
entrepreneurial nature of the individual firm's decision making. This would not be the case
with large-scale direct subsidies. A more equitable and effective alternative to expenditure
subsidies is for the federal government to provide generalized tax incentives for private-sector
investment in R&D.
This approach has several attractive features. It would be available to all private companies that pay U.S. income taxes. Private companies receiving the incentive would choose
the projects they wish to undertake. Finally, and most relevant, the private firms involved in
R&D would continue to bear most of the financial risk; the government's share would be much
smaller.
We have a good example of that approach in the R&D tax credit which expired last
year. It should be revived and perhaps increased. Researchers in this field continue to debate
the benefits and costs of that R&D tax credit. 34 There is one aspect, however, on which no
controversy exists; namely that the reluctance of Congress to enact this provision on a permanent basis sharply reduces its effectiveness. To extend credit begrudgingly a year or two at a
time makes it less likely that companies will take account of this incentive in their decisionmaking on long range commitments to R&D, such as building and operating expensive new
laboratories.
A recent study at the National Bureau of Economic Research estimates that the response to a temporary change in the tax credit is about one-half of the reaction to a permanent
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change. The report notes that R&D spending adjusts slowly to revisions in tax rules since
many projects cannot be started or stopped on short notice. The NBER study also estimates
that a permanent increase of 5 percent in the R&D tax credit would increase long-run private
spending on R&D by about 5-10 percent.35 The existing 10 percent credit for R&D surely
should be made permanent. Consideration also should be given to increasing it, perhaps to 20
percent. Most important, the private firm undertaking the R&D would still be bearing most of
the risk.

Reforming the Military Procurement Process
No serious discussion of encouraging new technology can ignore the present array of
costly and burdensome regulation that accompanies the military acquisition process. This inhibits the cross-flow of innovation between the military and civilian sectors. Since the end of
the Second World War, the Department of Defense has been a major financier of R&D and the
largest purchaser and developer of new scientific applications. It is also true that past spin-offs
from military technology constitute an impressive group- computers, jet airliners, composite
materials, communications equipment, and scientific instruments. For decades, many companies primarily oriented to civilian markets benefitted from commercial use of spin-offs from
high-powered defense research and development.
The Raytheon Corporation adapted radar technology to develop the microwave oven
(first called the "Radarange"). Boeing drew on its military aircraft design work on the B-47
and KC-135 in developing the 707 commercial airliner, although the 707 and the KC-135 were
both descended from a common company-sponsored prototype (the "dash 80").
Over the past decade, however, the relationship between military and civilian R&D has
changed radically. The roles of the public and private sectors often have been reversed in the
military sphere itself, in good measure because of the growing intricacies of the military

acquisition procedures. As a result, if a technology has both civilian and military use, the
more advanced models are now more likely to be seen at Radio Shack than in military systems.
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In the case of semiconductors, extremely detailed military specifications have isolated defense
production, dividing the U.S. industrial base between defense and commercial uses. Due to
the rigidity of military specifications and requirements, chips made for the Defense Department
are many times more expensive and often one or more generations behind their commercial
counterparts. 36
Many currently deployed weapons use technologies dating to the 1970s or earlier. The
existing acquisition process often requires as much as twenty years to move a major weapon
system from R&D to deployment. Clearly, that not only increases costs but it inhibits
technological innovation. This drawn out development process also reduces the return on contractor-financed investments in defense R&D and thus reduces the incentives for such undertakings. The B-2 Stealth bomber and the Seawolf submarine both have computer chips in key
components that are merely run-of-the-mill, rather than state-of-the-art. The design of electronic parts in these weapons had to be frozen years ago in order to meet the requirements of
the lengthy military production cycle. But, since then, it has been the civilian computer industry that has been innovating at a rapid pace.
The armed services I ability to develop advanced weaponry depends more and more on
how well they and their contractors can "spin on" civilian advances to military products.
Military research in electronics, for example, is now so exotic and slow that it offers little
commercial use. The tables have turned. The Department of Defense has become a net user
of civilian research. However, the many barriers of the military acquisition process impede
the transfer of advanced technology from the civilian economy to the military establishment. 37
As a result, many high-tech manufacturers have set up walls to keep out those bureaucratic influences. To prevent their civilian-oriented divisions from becoming "contaminated"
by the military Is bureaucratic approach, companies selling to the armed services often go out
of their way to insulate their military work. Thus, fiber optics companies doing business with
the Department of Defense have set up special divisions to do so. In that way, the military 1s
special accounting, auditing, and personnel requirements do not apply to the rest of the com-
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pany. Unwittingly, of course, sensible actions such as these impede the flow of new technology between the public and private sectors.
Fundamental changes in the way that the military establishment make its purchases
from the private sector are essential. Because American technology is increasingly oriented to
civilian needs, the government's acquisition regulations should be modified to encourage, or at
least permit, the defense establishment to draw more on commercial product developments. Of
course, this is much easier said than done. The people in the Pentagon who make a career out
of writing military specifications can be expected to object to any attempt to buy more off-theshelf commercial products, whether they provide the Defense Department with superior technology or not. Such a shift in government purchasing on a large scale would put many regulation writers and acquisition reviewers out of work.
An egregious example of such bureaucratic busywork is the "Buy American" provisions of the federal procurement laws which inhibit purchasing from the open market.
Officials responsible for acquisition must carefully check whether any one of the numerous
components of a product contains a single forbidden foreign element. Other obstacles to buying more off-the-shelf commercial products include the rules on steering a certain percentage of
procurement to small, handicapped, and minority firms and the onerous "do-it-by-the-numbers"
provisions of the Competition in Contracting Act. Anyone who doubts the severity of the
problem should be forced -

as I recently have -

to read the military procurement regulations

cover to cover!
A dose of deregulation administered to the entire military procurement process would
yield many benefits. First of all, the elimination or reduction of the numerous restrictions
would reduce the overhead costs of both the government and the private contractors.
Moreover, a streamlined acquisition system would make it easier for the military establishment
to use the latest components available in the commercial economy. Because the Department of
Defense remains a large customer of American business, such a reform would encourage the
development of high-tech products on the part of private-sector firms that cater to both markets.
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Conclusion

There are few, if any, overt advocates of socialism in the federal government.
However, people often want to add just a "teeny weeny" bit of government guidance to help
business work better. Over the years, numerous government subsidies with that type of justification have been enacted. These include many generalized subsidies to farmers, ship construction and operating companies, credit subsidies to a great variety of private-sector borrowers,
and subsidies for a host of technological projects. As we have seen, most of this federal
support proved wasteful or outright counterproductive. A reasonable argument can be made
that each of these subsidies to what was a popular technological activity at the time served to
divert money from more promising competing technologies. In some cases, the federal outlays
pushed efforts toward premature commercialization that discredited the basic concept, perhaps
even needlessly.
Technology policy has become the newest euphemism for the more controversial and
discredited industrial policy. According to a former senior Commerce Department official,
business executives do not advocate an industrial policy, rather "they want the government
involved in high-risk, long-term, expensive, high-technology research projects. "38 Or, in the
words of one academic supporter, "The government should not give handouts, but it should
help strategically placed industries at strategic times. "39 Any long-term observer of the
Washington scene knows that, inevitably, the political process will decide which high-risk,
long-term, strategic industries and projects will be selected. The chosen few will, by definition, meet these subjective requirements. Politically weak companies by default will not be
"strategic," "high-risk, or "long-term.
II

II

The results will be indistinguishable from a federal

spending program formally labeled "industrial policy. 11
Despite a surface attractiveness, current proposals for direct government support of
commercially relevant technology fall into this category. Government has demonstrated no aptitude for choosing among promising new scientific or technological projects. The Clinton
Administration enthusiasts for new government initiatives would do well to ponder on Paul
Samuelson's cogent reminder:
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One of the small virtues of a market laissez-faire system is that when it makes
a terrible mistake and produces mousetraps that people don't want or which
don't work, somebody runs out of money and gets rapped on the knuckles.
That's why the Lord created bankruptcy.
Samuelson goes on to note that, "In government we really do very often throw good
money after bad even after almost everybody can see that something is not working. "40 That
is precisely what happened in the case of the ill-fated supersonic transport when, in 1971,
Senate supporters suggested that cancellation of the project would not be responsible in view of
the substantial outlays that had been made for the SST. 41
Government policymakers must learn to refrain from jumping every time a constituency asks for help. The current pressure to "do more" for the promotion of technology is
not an exceptional case. Even a cursory examination of past and current large-scale government efforts to promote the use of civilian science and technology does not inspire confidence
in the ability of federal agencies to choose among alternative technologies and their uses. The
Clinton Administration should abandon its proposal to set up business-government partnerships
in such areas as computer linkage, automobile design, and environmental technology. The
United States holds a strong position in each of these areas. Governmental participation would
constitute an unnecessary diversion with its usual combination of "free" money, but with lots
of strings attached.
Some obstacles to the commercialization of technology, it must be recognized, arise
from shortcomings in the private sector- shortcomings which can only be remedied by business executives themselves. For example, many experts contend that, despite superior
American achievements in science per se, Japanese firms are strong competitors because they
assign more talent to such engineering activities as detailed product design and quality control.
They place their most talented engineers in production, unlike the U.S. practice. As a result,
much of their product development is done in the factory where the product is produced rather
than in a remote laboratory. Thus, Japanese firms often enjoy quicker responsiveness to market opportunities, lower costs, and equal or better quality than U.S. manufacturers. 42
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Not too surprisingly, widespread concern is evident in American industry about the
ability to move products from the laboratory to the marketplace. An example frequently cited
is the videocassette recorder (VCR), which was invented in the United States. Two Japanese
firms, Sony and Matsushita, now control 90 percent of the U.S. market, and the remaining 10
percent is supplied by other foreign firms. There is only one place to lodge the responsibility
for dealing with such challenges to American management and that is, of course, business
management itself.
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